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Introduction
In the midst of the tension between 
traditionalist (fiqh) and rationalist (kalām) 
scholars in the tenth and eleventh century, 
modern scholars describe this period as triumph 
era of traditionalism signified by the issuance of 
the Qādirī creed (Makdisi, 1991: 41-42) and  the 
period of synthesis between traditionalism and 
rationalism indicated by the formulation of uṣūl 
al-fiqh (legal theory) (Hallaq, 2005: 127-128). 
However, these portraits of the tenth-eleventh 
century of Muslim scholarship are not fully 
accurate due to some rationalist-theologians 
who were still active in writing and teaching, 
including Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī and 
his kalām teachers or students. This suggests 
that the rational-theologians were not entirely 
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Abstract
This article examines Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī’s application of jadal theory 
in both his legal and theological work by analyzing critically his  major writings, 
namely: Kitāb al-Irshād (1950), al-Kāfīya fī al-jadal (1979), al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-
fiqh (1980), al-Durrah al-Muḍīyah fī mā waqaʿa fīhi al-khilāf bayn al-Shāfiʿīyah wa 
al-Ḥanafīyah (1986), and Tafḍīl madhhab al-Shāfiʿī ʿalā sā’ir al-madhāhib (2013). 
Through a hermeneutical reading of these books, I find that Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s 
application of jadal renders the integration of kalām and fiqh. At first, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn aims to obtain knowledge with a certain level of certainty (in the forms of 
ʿilm or ghalabat al-ẓann) in law and theology by applying jadal in both disciplines. 
Then, this scholarly attempt of obtaining certainty interestingly provides an 
epistemological ground for the integration of kalām and fiqh. He inserts theological 
elements in his legal scholarship and incorporates a juridical perspective in his 
theological work. As a result, he “rationalizes” Shāfiʿī legal doctrines on the one hand 
and “traditionalizes” rational theology on the other. This epistemological foundation 
for the integration of kalām and fiqh is important not only because it provides a 
different description of Islamic intellectual history, but also redefines the concept of 
Sunnī in the eleventh century.
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defeated and eliminated, especially in the 
eastern part of Muslim world, like Nīshāpūr. In 
addition, the uṣūl al-fiqh literature in the circles 
of legal scholarship during this period was still 
textually based and centered on the authority 
of traditional sources where, instead of calling 
uṣūl al-fiqh as synthesis between fiqh and 
kalām, it would be more accurate to call it as 
advancement or an expansion of traditionalist 
(fiqh) thoughts.
This article discusses an important theme 
that is absent from the traditionalism victory 
narrative and synthesis narrative, which is the 
role of jadal (dialectical theory and practice in 
Islamic tradition) in the integration of kalām 
(i.e. rational theology) and fiqh (i.e. traditional 
jurisprudence). The existence of jadal theory 
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and practical application challenges such 
narrative of traditionalism victory and synthesis. 
It shows that the rational-theologians were not 
entirely defeated and eliminated, especially in 
the eastern part of Muslim world, like Nīshāpūr, 
and uṣūl al-fiqh is not a form of synthesis, but 
an extension of traditionalist (fiqh) thoughts. 
This study applies a critical and hermeneutical 
analysis to read and analyze Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
al-Juwaynī’s legal and theological works in which 
he applies his jadal (dialectic) theory. Among 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s works that this study 
employs are Kitāb al-Irshād (1950), al-Kāfīya fī 
al-jadal (1979), al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh (1980), 
al-Durrah al-Muḍīyah fī mā waqaʿa fīhi al-
khilāf bayn al-Shāfiʿīyah wa al-Ḥanafīyah 
(1986), and Tafḍīl madhhab al-Shāfiʿī ʿalā sā’ir 
al-madhāhib (2013). 
Previous studies on Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-
Juwaynī’s scholarly career and works focus on 
his contribution in legal and political thought 
(Siddiqui, 2019), particular legal or theological 
text (Saflo, 2000), influence on another scholar 
(Abdullah, 1995), and political thought of the 
imamate (Muhammad, 1995). None of these 
studies recognize the importance of jadal 
(dialectic) in Imam al-Haramayn’s intellectual 
legacy. Other studies may have elaborated briefly 
on Imam al-Haramayn’s theory of jadal in their 
works, such as Walter Edward Young (Young, 
2012), Larry B. Miller (Miller, 1984), and Mehmet 
Kadri Karabela (Karabela, August, 2010).  But, 
the discussion in these works is limited and 
the centrality of Imam al-Haramayn’s jadal 
application of jadal and its implication in the 
Islamic intellectual history in the tenth-eleventh 
century is absent. 
This article, by reading closely Imam al-
Haramayn’s al-Juwayni’s legal and theological 
works, recognizes the pivotal role of jadal 
(dialectic or debate) in Imam al-Haramayn’s 
works and argues that Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s 
application of jadal in his scholarly treatises 
leads to the integration of kalām (Islamic 
theology) and fiqh (Islamic law). At first, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn aims to obtain certainty in Islamic 
law and theology by applying jadal in both 
fields of Islamic scholarship. This attempt of 
obtaining certainty interestingly renders a new 
development in Islamic intellectual history, 
which is the integration of kalām and fiqh. 
This integration is important not only because 
it provides a different description of Islamic 
intellectual history in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, but also redefines the concept of 
Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah (Sunnīsm). 
If Sunnīsm from the tenth to the first half of 
eleventh century is associated with major 
Islamic legal schools, after the integration of 
kalām and fiqh in the eleventh century by Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, Ashʿarī scholastic 
theology is also integrated into the body of 
Sunnī orthodoxy. 
Result And Discussion
A Brief Biography of Imām al-
Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī
Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī’s full name 
is ʿAbd al-Malik b. al-Shaykh Abū Muḥammad 
ʿAbdullāh b. Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf b. ʿAbdullāh b. 
Yūsuf b. Muḥammad b. Hayyūyah al-Juwaynī 
(Ibn Khallikān, 1968: 167). More frequently, 
however, he was addressed by his well-known 
honorific name “Imām al-Ḥaramayn (The 
Imām of the Two Noble Sanctuaries: Mecca and 
Medina).” This name is used by Abū Isḥāq al-
Shīrāzī’s Ṭabaqāt, Abū Ghafir al-Fārisī’s Siyāq al-
Nīsābūr, Ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-aʿyān, al-
Subkī’s Ṭabaqāt, and also Ibn Kathīr’s Ṭabaqāt. 
Therefore, in this article, the name of Imām al-
Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī is used to refer to “ʿAbd 
al-Malik b. al-Shaykh Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdullāh 
al-Juwaynī.” 
He lived in the time when medieval religious, 
social, and political landscape transformed from 
Shiʿa political domination in the tenth century 
to “Sunni Revival” in the eleventh century 
(Makdisi, 1990). Nīshāpūr became one of the 
centers where such transformation occurred. 
He was born in Muḥarram 419/ February 1028 
and was died in the village named Bushtaniqān 
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in the year 478/1085 (Ibn Khallikān, 1968: 169). 
He was the first director of Nizamiyya madrasa 
in Nishapur in 450/1058. For the last thirty years 
before his death in 1085/478, Imām ̣Ḥaramayn 
al-Juwaynī was the unchallenged leader of the 
Shafi`ī faction both in official position and 
in scholarly accomplishment (Bulliet, 1972: 
124-125). He wrote books on a wide variety 
of topics ranging from theology, legal theory, 
politic, dialectic, and other religious sciences. 
The majority of his books are in fact written in 
order to formulate a juridical and theological 
foundation for the new social balance and 
order Sunni revival in the eleventh century. 
Among his writings are: al-Burhān fī Uṣul al-
Fiqh, Kitāb al-Irshād ilā Qawaṭiʿ al-Adilla fī 
Uṣūl al-Iʿtiqād, al-Kāfiya fī al-Jadal, Kitāb 
al-Waraqāt fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl 
al-Dīn, Ghiyāth al-Umam fī Iltiyāth al-Ẓulam, 
Mughīth al-Khalq fī Tarjīh al-Qawl al-Ḥaqq, 
Nīhayat al-Maṭlab fī Dirāyat al-Madhhab, al-
Durra al-Muḍiyya fīmā Waqaʿa fīhi Bayna al-
Shafiʿiyya wa’l-Ḥanafiyya, Shifā’ al-Ghalīl fī 
Bayān mā Waqaʿa fī’l-Taura wa’l-Injīl min al-
Tabdīl, al-ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya, and Lumaʿ al-
Adilla fī Qawaʿid ʿAqa’id Ahl al-Sunna wa al-
Jamaʿah, and and Tafḍīl madhhab al-Shāfiʿī 
ʿalā sā’ir al-madhāhib.
The Application of Jadal and Its 
Implications
Jadal is an Islamic form of dialectic 
(disputation or debate). Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
defines it as “when two dialecticians present 
the core of their views on the basis of reciprocal 
attack (al-tanāfī) and defense (al-tadāfuʿ) 
through a linguistic expression or something that 
can substitute its function such as a signification 
(ishārah) and an indicant (dalālah)” (al-Juwaynī, 
1979: 21). He wrote a specific treatise on the 
theory and rules of dialectic in the book entitled 
al-Kāfiya fī al-Jadal (see its more elaborated 
discussion in Widigdo, 2018: 271-308). 
His jadal theory was applied in a written 
form and did not necessarily follow the order 
of ordinary jadal questions, ranging from the 
question on the nature of the opponent’s opinion 
and its proofs. Since Imām al-Ḥaramayn was 
already familiar with the opinions held by his 
opponents, he did not deem it necessary to ask 
his opponents introductory jadal questions, 
which were about the nature of their opinions 
(e.g. “Do you have an opinion?” and “What is 
your opinion?”). Furthermore, in most cases, 
he even skipped the third jadal question, which 
refers to the existence of the proof (e.g. “Do you 
have a proof?”), and directly employed the fourth 
jadal question, which is a question about the 
verification of the proof (e.g. “Is your proof the 
correct proof?”). However, on certain occasions 
when the opinion and its proofs are clearly 
recognizable, Imām al-Ḥaramayn often jumped 
to attack his opponents by using different modes 
of iʿtirāḍ (refutation). 
a. Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s jadal with fel-
low Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī scholars
Imām al-Ḥaramayn employs jadal not only 
to argue against adversaries from non-Shāfiʿī and 
Ashʿarī scholars but also against scholars from 
within Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī inner circles. Although 
the main purpose of having an argument with 
his fellow Shāfiʿī or Ashʿarī scholars was to know 
God’s attributes, commands, and prohibitions 
with a degree of confidence that renders certainty, 
the application of jadal had another important 
implication for him. In the context of Shāfiʿī legal 
scholarship, Imām al-Ḥaramayn pushes doctrinal 
boundaries within Shāfiʿī legal tradition. 
1. Jadal with al-Shāfiʿī
In al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh, he shows a 
number of disagreements with al-Shāfiʿī. Then, 
without posing a formal jadal question since 
he knows al-Shāfiʿī’s position and the proof 
that al-Shāfiʿī cites, he directly applies a type of 
refutation (iʿtirāḍ) called muʿāraḍah (objection) 
to challenge al-Shāfiʿī’s opinion or his use of 
textual proof in some cases.
First, he challenges al-Shāfiʿī’s definition and 
hierarchy of bayān. Imām al-Shāfiʿī understood 
al-bayān as God’s mode of communication in 
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the Qur’an, which was revealed in Arabic.1 Imām 
al-Shāfiʿī classified this mode of communication 
(al-bayān) in a certain hierarchy of clarity and 
authority (marātib al-bayān) (al-Shāfiʿī, 1940: 
270-486), which was summarized by Imām al-
Ḥaramayn in the following: The first and the 
highest order of bayān is a univocal term (naṣṣ) 
that signifies the intended (meaning) without 
confusion. 
The second order in the hierarchy of bayān 
is a speech that has clear and obvious intended 
meanings; nevertheless, no one can understand 
this bayān nor its intended meanings except for 
those who are intelligent and well versed in Arabic. 
The third order of bayān is something mentioned 
in the Qur’an but its detailed explanation is 
referred to the Prophet Muḥammad. The fourth 
order of bayān is sound reports from the Prophet 
Muḥammad. The fifth order of bayān is reasoning 
by analogy (al-qiyās). The qiyās employs premises 
(either aṣl or illah) that are derived from what has 
been established in the Qur’an and Sunnah (al-
Juwaynī, 1980: 160-162).
In response to al-Shāfiʿī’s definition of bayān 
and its hierarchical order, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
provides a refutation (iʿtirāḍ) in the forms of 
muʿāraḍah (objection). Instead of following al-
Shāfiʿī in defining bayān as God’s different ways 
of communication, Imām al-Ḥaramayn defines 
bayān from the perspective of both theologian 
and jurist. In an agreement with his teacher, Abū 
Bakr al-Bāqillānī, he defines bayān as “the proof” 
(al-dalīl). By defining bayān as dalīl, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn extended the scope of bayān. As a 
proof, either in the context of legal or theological 
¹Imām al-Shāfiʿī defined al-bayān as follows: “A term 
that comprises meanings converging in principles but di-
verging in their details. The minimum common denomina-
tor in those converging and diverging meanings is that those 
meanings are bayān directed to whosoever is addressed 
thereby among those people in whose language the Qur’an 
was revealed. Although some of the meanings have stronger 
emphasis of bayān than others, they look almost the same 
to Arabic speakers but look different to people who do not 
know Arabic.” See (al-Shāfiʿī, 1940:  21) In this regard, Jo-
seph Lowry summarizes that al-Shāfiʿī views al-bayān as a 
term that represents “a statement, communication, or ad-
dress to someone, in Arabic language” (Lowry, 2007:  25).
context, bayān comprises not only traditional-
religious proof (al-samʿī) but also rational proof 
(al-ʿaqlī) (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 160 and 165).
Imām al-Ḥaramayn categorizes al-Shāfiʿī’s 
understanding of bayān as traditional proof 
(al-bayān al-samʿī) because the basis for its 
authoritativeness is rooted in God’s divine and 
inimitable speech, which is the Qur’an. However, 
compared to al-Shāfiʿī, he gave a slightly different 
hierarchy of bayān. Instead of classifying 
different modes of speech and its clarity in the 
Qur’an, Imām al-Ḥaramayn classifies a hierarchy 
of traditional proofs (bayān al-samʿīyāt) based 
on their close relationship with the Qur’an. 
According to Imām al-Ḥaramayn, the priority 
should be given to the proof that has a closer 
relation with the Qur’an. According to Imām al-
Ḥaramayn, the first hierarchical order of bayān 
as proof is whatever had been received from the 
Prophet Muḥammad. This is considered a divine 
proof (dalīl al-muʿjizah), which consists of the 
Qur’an itself and the Sunnah of the Prophet 
and both are received and transmitted from the 
utterance of the Messenger (min lafẓ rasūlillāh). 
The second order of the proof is ijmāʿ (consensus). 
The third order of the proof is different ways of 
reasoning that scholars could have a consensus 
on their authoritativeness, namely: the Prophetic 
report that has only a solitary line of transmission 
and reasoning by analogy (qiyās). 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn adds one kind of bayān, 
being the absence in al-Shāfiʿī’s discussion of 
bayān, which is al-bayān al-ʿaqlī (rational proof). 
There is no hierarchical order in this bayān. To 
be a valid proof, the rational bayān should have 
two valid premises so that a sound conclusion 
or knowledge can be derived (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 
165).
Second, he criticizes al-Shāfiʿī in the discussion 
about the legal basis of the authoritativeness of 
ijmāʿ (ḥujjīyat al-ijmāʿ). Al-Shāfiʿī claims that 
the authority of ijmāʿ is based on the following 
verse of the Qur’an, Sūrah al-Nisā’ 4: 115:
“And whoever splits with the Messenger after 
that guidance has become manifest to him, and 
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follows other than the way of the believers (sabīl 
al-mu’minīn), We shall turn him to that which he 
has turned and make him enter hell; and it is an 
evil resort.”
Al-Shāfiʿī implements this verse to suggest 
that the believers could come to a consensus (i.e. 
sabīl al-mu’minīn) in a certain matter. If there 
is one who dissents or breaches the consensus, 
according to al-Shāfiʿī, it means that they have split 
with the community of believers and do not follow 
the same path. In other words, the justification 
of the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ is based on the 
understanding of the sabīl al-mu’minīn (literally: 
the way of the believers), which was translated as 
the consensus of the believers.
Imām al-Ḥaramayn presents one objection 
(munāqaḍah) to this argument. He argues that 
the addresses in the above verse are not those 
who have a dissenting opinion against of the 
consensus of believers. Rather, he argues, the 
verse is directed to those who desire a disbelieving 
act, attribute falsehood to the Prophet, and/or 
turn away from traditions of truth. Therefore, 
he continues, the proper ordering of the verse’s 
meaning is, “And whoever splits with the 
Messenger after that guidance has become 
manifest to him, and follows other than the way 
of the believers who follow him (the Prophet),2 
We will turn him to that which he has turned…” 
In this understanding, the way of believers (sabīl 
al-mu’minīn) is interpreted not as a consensus 
of the believers in a random case, but as the way 
of believers who follow the path and the example 
of the Prophet. This interpretation is more 
consistent and coherent with the beginning of the 
verse that addresses the case of those who split 
with the Prophet.
For Imām al-Ḥaramayn, a different 
interpretation of the above verse shows 
that the verse cannot be used to justify the 
authoritativeness of the ijmāʿ. The verse is an 
²The bold is mine. In Imām al-Haramayn’s interpreta-
tion, this phrase indicates that the way of believers that is 
mentioned in the verse is actually designating the way of be-
lievers who follow the prophet, not an independent way of 
the believers that has no relation with the path of the Proph-
et, which is mentioned in the beginning of the verse.
interpretable text of the Qur’an (ẓāhir) renders no 
certainty (al-qaṭʿ) but probabilities (muḥtamalāt 
or ẓunūn). The authoritativeness of ijmāʿ, as one 
of the traditional proofs that can yield certainty, 
cannot be established by a probable proof like 
that of interpretable text of the Qur’an. It should 
be proof that yields certainty, like univocal text 
of the Qur’an (naṣṣ al-Qur’ān), univocal text of 
the Prophetic Sunnah with recurrent chains of 
transmission (naṣṣ ḥadīth mutawātir), and certain 
rational proofs that yield certainty. Therefore, the 
claim that the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ that is 
based on the verse of the Qur’an in Sūrah al-Nisā’: 
115 can be refuted by providing another possible 
interpretation of that verse, which makes the 
verse no longer in the level of univocal text (naṣṣ) 
but in the level of interpretable or equivocal text 
(ẓāhir) (al-Juwaynī, 1980, 677-678).
Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s objection is also applied 
to those who argue that the authoritativeness of 
ijmāʿ can be based on the ḥadīth, “My ummah 
(nation) will not agree on error.” Although 
this ḥadīth has a variety of wordings, its chain 
of transmissions is still in the level of solitary 
reports (akhbār al-āḥād), not reaching the level 
of recurrent and corroborative reports (khabar 
mutawātir). Ḥadīth with a solitary report 
cannot be used as a basis for the justification 
of religious epistemological authorities (e.g. 
ijmāʿ) that demand an epistemological certainty 
(qaṭʿīyāt). Furthermore, the meaning of this 
ḥadīth designates not only the possibility of 
the occurrence of ijmāʿ but can also mean a 
good tiding, revelation of the unseen, and an 
announcement that ummah of the Prophet will 
not apostatize until the Day of Judgment (al-
Juwaynī, 1980: 679). It means that the above 
ḥadīth is also subject to interpretation (ẓāhir), 
as the above Qur’anic text that cannot render an 
objective certainty (qaṭʿ). Accordingly, the ḥadīth 
cannot be used to justify the authoritativeness 
of ijmāʿ, not only because of its solitary chain of 
transmission but also because of its interpretable 
nature of the text (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 678-679).
After refuting the claims of authoritativeness 
of ijmāʿ based on the Qur’an and Ḥadīth, Imām 
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al-Ḥaramayn proposes an alternative justification 
of ijmāʿ, which he considered more valid than the 
above Qur’anic verse and solitary ḥadīth. Instead 
of using scriptural basis for the justification, he 
employed a more empirical and experiential 
basis for the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ. The first 
foundation of ijmāʿ is when qualified scholars 
in a given time from all geographical locations 
agree on a qualification of a certain ẓannī legal 
issue.3 The agreed legal qualification cannot 
be derived from a pure rational (non-textual 
oriented) reasoning. The existing custom (iṭṭirād 
al-iʿtiyād) has proven that scholars cannot come 
to a complete agreement with rational certainty 
when non-textual oriented tools of reasoning 
are used. Therefore, according to Imām al-
Ḥaramayn, in order to have a consensus on a 
qualification of ẓannī legal matters, scholars 
must base their reasoning on what they consider 
indubitable textual evidence (samʿī qatʿī), not 
on ẓannī (probable or uncertain) textual or 
rational proofs  (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 780-781). 
When a qualified scholar bases their reasoning 
on indubitable textual evidence in order to issue 
a ẓannī legal judgment, and every other scholar 
employs a similar line of reasoning and produces 
the same the ẓannī legal judgment, the collective 
agreement of those scholars on a ẓannī legal 
judgment is called “consensus (ijmāʿ).”
The second foundation of the authorita-
tiveness of ijmāʿ is when scholarly consensus 
on a judgment of ẓannī legal matters is reached, 
those who contravene consensus of scholars 
will be charged with deviance, perversion, and 
disobedience. Imām al-Ḥaramayn writes:
“We have found that past generations and extinct 
nations have agreed to reproach those who devi-
ate from the consensus of scholars—scholars of 
the time—, and charged those who deviate with 
deviance, perversion, and disobedience…let their 
consensus on reproaching and rebuking those 
who deviate (from consensus of scholars) be a 
foundation of legal certainty” (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 
681-682). 
³This is a kind of legal issue that is not addressed ex-
plicitly by the Qur’an or Ḥadīth with a degree of certainty 
(qaṭʿī).
In other words, when consensus of the 
qualified scholars is widely accepted and 
adopted by the ummah as their custom, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn believed that such custom can be a 
justification for the legal certainty of ijmāʿ. Based 
on this custom, the ummah will collectively 
condemn those who deviate from the consensus 
of scholars.
The jadal over al-Shāfiʿī’s opinions in 
the issue of the hierarchy of bayān and the 
authoritativeness of ijmāʿ have two important 
consequences. First, by defining bayān 
as a proof (dalīl) in his refutation against 
al-Shāfiʿī’s hierarchy of bayān, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn not only employed traditional 
proofs but also rational proofs (bayān ʿaqlī) 
in order to ascertain knowledge with a certain 
degree of confidence. As a result, reason as 
a non-textual tool of reasoning obtains an 
important place in Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s 
work. The inclusion of rational proofs (bayān 
ʿaqlī) as legitimate proofs in order to obtain 
(legal) knowledge with certainty can be called 
“rationalization” of legal scholarship within 
Shāfiʿī legal tradition. Second, by refuting 
al-Shāfiʿī’s “textual” argument to justify the 
authoritativeness of ijmāʿ and relying more on 
empirical and “customary” evidence for such 
justification, Imām al-Ḥaramayn consciously 
or not made two “objective”4 ways to establish 
the foundations of ijmāʿ. One, every Muslim 
can conduct an empirical observation to 
assess whether the actual consensus among 
qualified scholars happens. Two, anyone can 
also evaluate whether or not an established 
customary practice actually condemns the 
heretics and deviants.
2. Jadal with Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, 
among the leading Shāfiʿī scholars
In addition to jadal with al-Shāfiʿī as the 
founder of the legal school that he follows, Imām 
⁴Objective means that every Muslim in the time of ijmāʿ 
has a sensible tool, which is an empirical observation and 
experience, to know whether or not the actual agreement 
among the qualified scholars happens and whether or not 
the custom of people condemns the deviants and heretics. 
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al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī engages in jadal with 
the leading Shāfiʿī scholars in his time, such as 
Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī. Al-Subkī recorded the 
disputation between these two influential Shāfiʿī 
scholars in the eleventh century in Ṭabaqāt al-
Shāfiʿīyah al-Kubrā (al-Subkī, 1386H/1967: 214-
218). One of the subjects of disputation is about 
whether it is permissible for legal guardians to 
force a mature-virgin girl (al-bikr al-bālighah) to 
marry. 
Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī argues that it is 
permissible for a father of a mature-virgin girl 
to force her to get married without her consent 
because the girl is still a virgin (bikārat al-aṣl), 
although the permissibility originally applies 
when the girl is still a child (ṣaghīrah). Al-Shīrāzī 
argues further that the effective cause (ʿillah) for 
this “permissibility” legal judgment is the virginity 
of the girl (bikārat al-aṣl), which is among the 
effective causes that are established by religious 
sources (al-ʿilal al-sharʿīyah). 
Sheikh Imām Abū al-Maʿālī al-Ḥaramayn 
al-Juwaynī (Q) refutes the proof of al-Shīrāzī by 
saying: 
“I have a comment5 based on the proof you have 
provided from the Prophetic report (khabar) 
and an intellectual reasoning (naẓar). Regard-
ing the prophetic report (khabar), it contains a 
possibility of interpretation (al-ta’wīl). The re-
port can mean, ‘al-thayību aḥaqqu bi nafsihā 
(the widow has more right of herself),’ because 
the marriage cannot be held without her verbal 
consent. The virgin is vice versa. If the khabar 
contains a possibility of interpretation, we inter-
pret (the khabar), as I have said, with an inter-
pretation that yields certain knowledge (al-ʿilm). 
For a mature-virgin girl (al-bikr al-bālighah), 
all causes that invalidate the guardianship of a 
guardian has been collected and she has an au-
tonomy to exercise her own right. Since a woman 
only needs a guardian because of the absence of 
autonomy either because of her child-age (ṣighr) 
or mental illness (junūn). If the causes that in-
validate the guardianship of a guardian are ga-
thered, establishing the guardianship for her in 
the process of marriage without her permission 
is not permissible. There is a proof in the pro-
phetic report (khabar) that makes this interpre-
⁵This italic phrase is additional words inserted to make 
the sentence complete and understandable.
tation valid in two ways. One of them is that the 
Prophet mentions a legal guardian (al-walī) in its 
general term. He does not specify whether a fa-
ther, a grandfather, or other guardians. If the in-
tended meaning is the guardian who has capacity 
of imposing marriage—not general guardianship 
because there is consensus that other than father 
and grandfather has no authority to impose the 
marriage—, then certainly it means the attri-
bution of the verbal consent to the right of the 
widow and nullification of it from the right of the 
virgin. In this regard, the Prophet said,‘al-bikru 
tusta’dhanu wa idhnuhā ṣumātuhā (the virgin-
girl should be consulted and her consent is her 
silence).’ "This proves that the Prophet wants to 
assign the verbal consent (iʿtibār al-nuṭq) in the 
case of the widow” (al-Subkī, 1386H/1967: 215-
216).
The jadal between these two scholars still 
goes on without a clear resolution. However, this 
disputation presents an interesting intellectual 
orientation and development within Shāfiʿī 
legal scholarship. First, Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī 
represents a traditional view of Shāfiʿī scholars 
who rely heavily on textual evidences without 
further rational or contextual considerations. 
This “textual” tendency appears in his argument 
about the possibility of the guardian in forcing a 
mature-virgin girl to get married. He attempts 
to prove that the effective cause (ʿillah) for 
the permissibility is established by univocal-
textual evidence (naṣṣ) from the khabar.  The 
naṣṣ (univocal-textual evidence) clearly shows 
that the virginity (al-bikārah) becomes the 
effective cause for the permissibility and for 
the nullification of her right of verbal consent. 
According to al-Shīrāzī, there is no other 
possible interpretation other than this legitimate 
interpretation. 
Then, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī 
attempts to push this traditional tenet by arguing 
that the textual proof is actually not univocal 
(naṣṣ). Instead, the khabar contains a statement 
that opens more than one interpretation (ta’wīl). 
In other words, the textual evidence is equivocal 
(ẓāhir), accepting more than one interpretation 
(ta’wīl), not univocal (naṣṣ). In this regard, 
Imām Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī offered 
his alternative interpretation of the textual 
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evidence. Instead of using either virginity (al-
bikārah) or widowhood (al-thuyūbah) for the 
effective cause (ʿillah) of whether the guardian 
is legally permitted to force a mature-virgin girl, 
he employs “aḥaqqu bi nafsihā (has more right 
to herself)” to be the effective cause (ʿillah) of 
whether the guardian is permissible to force 
the mature-virgin girl. According to Imām al-
Ḥaramayn, the phrase means that a woman 
only needs a guardianship if she is incapable of 
exercising her own autonomy and right, such 
as a child-age (ṣighr) or mentally ill (junūn). 
Since the widow is capable of exercising her 
own right and autonomy, she has more right 
over herself than her guardian (al-thayyib/al-
ayyim aḥaqqu bi nafsihā min walīyihā). The 
same applies to the mature-virgin girl. He says, 
“If the causes that invalidate the guardianship 
of a guardian are gathered, establishing the 
guardianship for her in the process of marriage 
without her permission is not permissible” (al-
Subkī, 1386H/1967: 215-216). In the case of the 
mature-virgin, all causes and conditions that 
invalidate the guardianship are present, namely 
her autonomy, ability to exercise her right, 
and soundness of her mental state. Therefore, 
according to Imām al-Ḥaramayn, the guardian 
is not allowed to force her to get married. Her 
marriage can only proceed with her verbal 
consent, not with her silence or the authority of 
her guardian. 
In sum, through this specific type of jadal 
with his fellow Shāfiʿī legal scholars, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn attempted to go beyond a textual-
oriented reasoning and put a greater emphasis 
on a case-oriented reasoning. Accordingly, he 
pushed a traditional thought and boundaries 
within Shāfiʿī legal scholarship to be not only loyal 
to the textual evidence but also through paying 
attention to specific contexts and particular cases. 
Therefore, in the context of the above debate, the 
terms “virginity” is not applied generally to every 
virgin but only applied to a minor-virgin. The 
mature-virgin is excluded from the guardianship 
since she has her autonomy and can exercise her 
own right. 
3. Jadal with al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, and 
Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarā’īnī on ijtihād 
One of Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s disagreements 
with his fellow Ashʿarī scholars is related to the 
subject of ijtihād and mujtahid (the performer 
of ijtihād). The main point of disagreement 
is around the topic of ijtihād in matters of 
maẓnūnāt (probabilities).6 According to Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn, Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Abū Bakr al-
Bāqillānī, and some groups of people who agree 
with them maintain that two mujtahids who 
have divergent opinions with regard to a certain 
ruling in the context of maẓnūnāt, both of them 
are correct and rewarded (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 
1319). Imām al-Ḥaramayn classifis them into 
two groups: the moderate and the extreme. The 
moderate scholars (al-muqtaṣidūn) maintain 
that when the textual proofs and ijmāʿ are silent 
in determining the ruling of a given case, God 
actually does not prescribe a specific ruling (ḥukm 
muʿayyan). Therefore, an intelligent person (al-
nāẓir) is supposed to do the ijtihād (i.e. exerting 
an intellectual effort to find the most reasonable 
ruling in maẓnūnāt). If the mujtahid has a 
preponderance of conviction (ghalabat al-ẓann) 
regarding the ruling of a case, God then prescribes 
that he should follow his preponderance of 
conviction and act on it. Meanwhile, the extreme 
scholars (al-ghulāt) argue that there is no need 
for ijtihād in maẓnūnāt. A person can just chose 
one of the two opposing opinions, as he desires 
(al-Juwaynī, 1980: 1319-1320).
In contrast to al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, and 
those who follow their opinions, Abū Isḥāq 
Ibrāhīm al-Isfarā’īnī (d.418/1027) argues that 
only one mujtahid of the two opposing mujtahids 
is correct and rewarded in the context of 
maẓnūnāt, not both of them (al-Juwaynī, 1980, 
p. 1319). The moderates among those who follow 
the opinion of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarā’īnī would say 
that one of the mujtahids arrives at a correct 
opinion and he is rewarded for it. Meanwhile, 
⁶Al-maẓnūnāt refers to issues and cases that religious 
proofs, ranging from the Qur’an Ḥadīth, to Ijmāʿ, are either 
silent or inconclusive in determining their legal or theologi-
cal qualifications. 
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the other mujtahid is in error and he is to be 
forgiven for his incorrect opinion. Those who 
hold the “extreme” opinion would agree with the 
moderates in regard to the correct mujtahid but 
disagree with them in the context of the erring 
mujtahid. They argue that the erring mujtahid 
is committing a sin so that deserves a rejection 
and punishment (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 1320). 
However, both of them agree that two opposing 
opinions cannot be correct at the same time, 
one of them must be right and the other one 
must be wrong. They say, “It is impossible that 
one thing is both permissible and prohibited 
since both qualifications are oppositional and 
contradictory” (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 1320). 
In this regard, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-
Juwaynī provides a critical response to both 
camps, namely al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī, and 
others who maintain that two opposite mujtahids 
are correct and al-Isfarā’īnī and others who argue 
that only one mujtahid is correct. Then, he offers 
his original opinion with regard to this discussion. 
He attempted to reconcile those two opposing 
arguments by criticizing their weaknesses and 
adopting their strengths. In response to al-
Bāqillānī (and those who agree with him), Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn states:
“If by taṣwīb (considering both oppositional 
mujtahids correct) you mean an obligation for 
both mujtahids to act according to their respec-
tive probable opinion (ẓann), that is acceptable. 
However, if by taṣwīb you mean the abolition of 
ijtihād, establishment of free-selection (of the 
two opposing opinions), and conviction of the 
equality between the permission and prohibi-
tion, this is something that definitely contradicts 
the sharīʿah. We can know this contradiction by 
necessity and intuition. Furthermore, if by the 
word taṣwīb you mean, in reality, God has no 
fixed ruling (ḥukm ʿalā al-taʿyīn), then this un-
derstanding should also be rejected because the 
act of searching (al-ṭalab) cannot stand by itself. 
There must be a searched-object (al-maṭlūb). 
It is impossible to command the act of search-
ing without having the searched-object. As an il-
lustration, someone who is looking for a person 
named ‘Zayd’ at a house must think that Zayd 
is inside the house or not inside the house” (al-
Juwaynī, 1980: 1324). 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn continues: 
“…a mujtahid is regarded as correct when he acts 
in accordance to his probable opinion (ẓann) of 
God’s command and viewed as wrong when he 
does not end the ijtihād in the point where he can 
find the ruling of God (ḥukm Allāh) in reality. This 
is the preferred opinion. We explain it with two 
examples. One of them is the following: In real-
ity, God’s ruling is the prohibition. The mujtahid, 
when he performs ijtihād, is able to find the ruling 
of prohibition, he is correct from every direction. 
If the second mujtahid is more convinced with the 
opinion of reprehension (karāhah) and he acts on 
it, he is correct with regard to fact that he acts on 
the ruling of reprehension, but he is wrong with 
regard to the fact that he cannot find the ruling of 
prohibition” (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 1325).
In response to al-Isfarā’īnī and his fellows, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn writes:
“If by takhṭi’ah (considering one of the two oppos-
ing mujtahids erroneous) you mean that he is not 
obliged to act on his preponderance of conviction 
(ghalabat al-ẓann), this is a denial of something 
that there is no reason to deny. When the muj-
tahid possesses a preponderance of conviction 
(ghalaba ʿalā ẓannihi amr), God commands that 
he acts in accordance to his convincing opinion 
(ẓann). His opinion is not conditioned and in-
fluenced by opinion of others. If by takhṭi’ah you 
mean that the mujtahid is demanded to produce 
another opinion or conviction beyond ghalabat 
al-ẓann, there is no reason to accept it. When 
ijtihād and opinion/conviction are put in order, 
the result is ghalabat al-ẓann” (al-Juwaynī, 1980: 
1323).
The departure of Imām al-Ḥaramayn from the 
first group (i.e. taṣwīb) represented by al-Bāqillānī 
and the second group (i.e. takhṭi’ah) represented 
by al-Isfarā’īnī is interesting.7 First, he refutes 
the idea of al-Bāqillānī and his fellows who do 
not believe in the existence of the actual ruling of 
God (ḥukm Allāh al-muʿayyan) in maẓnūnāt but 
he accepts the idea of the importance of ijtihād 
and that mujtahid should act in accordance with 
7 Aron Zysow translates “taṣwīb” as infallibism and 
those who hold this idea of the correctness of every mujtahid 
as infallibists. Meanwhile, the term “takhṭi’ah” is translated 
as fallibism and those who recognize the possibility of error 
of mujtahid, especially one of the two opposing mujtahids, 
as fallibists (Zysow, 2013: 259-272). 
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his preponderance of conviction in a given case. 
On the other hand, he opposes the argument of 
al-Isfarā’īnī and his fellows regarding the binary 
right-wrong judgment (one is considered right 
and another is wrong) of the two oppositional 
mujtahids but accepts the idea that there is so called 
the truth, or God’s fixed ruling, that a mujtahid 
needs to pursue, at least, its approximation. In 
fact, according to Imām al-Haramayn, what is 
demanded from mujtahid is not to find the truth 
itself but to obtain the approximation of the truth 
(shabah). As a result, Imām al-Ḥaramayn once 
again goes beyond the existing Ashʿarī theological 
circles. He reconciles the two opposing arguments 
(taṣwīb and takhṭi’ah) by suggesting that two 
opposing mujtahids can be right in the sense that 
both of them have a preponderance of conviction 
and act according to it, but, one of them must be 
wrong in the sense that he does not find the ruling 
prescribed by God (i.e. the truth). Being wrong 
in this sense is not punished because as far as a 
mujtahid acts according to his ghalabat al-ẓann, 
he is still right and rewarded (although his ruling 
turns out to be wrong in God’s perspective). The 
important contribution of Imām al-Ḥaramayn to 
this discussion is that he introduced the concept of 
ghalabat al-ẓann (preponderance of conviction) 
and ashbah (the approximate truth). In other 
words, in the context of maẓnūnāt, the assignment 
of a mujtahid is not to find the truth (al-haqq) 
with its ontological certainty. Instead, he is only 
demanded to arrive at the approximate truth 
(al-ashbah) with a preponderance of conviction 
(ghalabat al-ẓann) and acts in accordance to it. 
This understanding of ijtihād and mujtahid goes 
well beyond the binary position of al-Bāqillānī 
and al-Isfarā’īnī and became an important 
contribution of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī in 
the advancement of the scholarship within Ashʿarī 
scholarly circles. 
b. Imām al_Haramayn’s Jadal with 
the Ḥanafī and Muʿtazilī scholars
Unlike jadal with fellow Shāfiʿī and 
Ashʿarī scholars that is aimed to push doctrinal 
boundaries, Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s jadal against 
non-Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī opponents is generally 
intended to defend Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī school 
of thoughts. In his work, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
provides “traditional” arguments against the 
Ḥanafī and Muʿtazilī scholars. 
1. Jadal with Ḥanafī scholars
One of the issues that Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
discusses is the Ḥanafī position on the comparison 
between the authority of a prophetic report with a 
solitary chain of transmission (khabar al-wāḥid) 
and reasoning by analogy (al-qiyās). Ḥanafī 
scholars argues that khabar al-wāḥid should 
be rejected if it contradicts qiyās (al-Juwaynī, 
2013: 77).. In response to this argument, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn defends the authority of khabar al-
wāḥid over qiyās. He writes:
“There is no doubt that the aṣl (the original source 
or case that serves as a proof) of the qiyās is the 
prophetic report (al-khabar). It is necessary to 
find an agreement between al-aṣl (the original 
case addressed in the textual proof/khabar) and 
al-farʿ (the test case). If the qiyās is in agreement 
with the aṣl, which is al-khabar, it is acceptable. 
However, if it is contradicting aṣl, we know that 
the qiyās is false. It is rationally and textually im-
possible to obtain harmony between aṣl and farʿ 
by modifying the original cases (uṣūl) to be equal 
with the test cases (furūʿ)” (al-Juwaynī, 2013: 
77-79).
One of the examples in which Imām al-
Ḥaramayn finds Abū Ḥanīfah and the Ḥanafī 
scholars giving priority to qiyās over a textual 
proof is the case of whether or not a ritual 
ablution (wuḍū’) or dirt removal (izālat al-
najāsah) using vinegar is acceptable. The Ḥanafī 
would say: 
“Al-Shāfiʿī is restrictive in using qiyās. He re-
fuses to apply qiyās in the case of removing dirt 
(najāsah) by using vinegar. Abū Ḥanīfah says, ‘The 
idea is to remove dirt. In the context of removing 
dirt, vinegar is faster than water. Therefore, vin-
egar can substitute for water” (al-Juwaynī, 2013: 
87-88).
Then, Imām al-Ḥaramayn answers:
“No. This is even not accurate because al-Shāfiʿī 
says, ‘The conclusion that water is dirt removal is 
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not established by qiyās.8 It is the (only) alterna-
tive in Islamic law. In principle, nothing else can 
be compared with it (in terms of its function as 
dirt removal)” (al-Juwaynī, 2013: 87-88).
As it can be seen from the above disputation, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn prefers to rely on a 
“traditional” textual proof advocated by al-Shāfiʿī 
to a “rational” proof supported by Abū Ḥanīfah and 
his students. In this regard, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
attempts not only to tackle external challenges 
from Ḥanafī scholars, but also at the same time, 
to convince his fellow Shāfiʿī scholars that he is 
still loyal to al-Shāfiʿī foundational teachings with 
regard to an adherence to a traditional-textual 
proof. 
2. Jadal with Muʿtazilī scholars
Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s jadal against Muʿtazilī 
scholars is largely aimed to “traditionalize” 
Muʿtazilī theological doctrines in a sense that 
their rational theology should be challenged 
with a reasoning that is more grounded in 
traditional proofs, ranging from the Qur’an, 
Sunnah, Ijmāʿ, to a sound qiyās. For example, 
he was engaged in the debate with Muʿtazilī 
scholars in the issue of God’s divine attributes. 
The Muʿtazilī theological school and their like-
minded scholars agree in denying the attributes 
that are associated with God. They generally 
present their rejection of divine attributes in 
three different forms of expression. One, some 
scholars maintain that God is living, knowing, 
and powerful in and of Himself (li nafsih). 
Two, some other scholars argue that the 
properties of living, knowing, and power reside 
in the essence of God because there is a most 
particular attribute associated with Him called 
“a state or mode (ḥālah or ḥāl)” that requires 
that He is living, knowing and powerful. Three, 
some of Muʿtazilī scholars insist that God is 
8The editor of the book Tafḍīl madhhab al-Shāfiʿī, 
Aḥmad Muṣtafā Qāsim al-Ṭahṭāwī, provides a textual cita-
tion to support this claim from Shāfiʿī scholars. Water is con-
sidered as a tool for dirt removal and purification is based 
on the Qur’an, Sūrah al-Anfāl: 8: 11, that reads:”…He sent 
down upon you water from the sky thet He thereby purify 
you…”(al-Juwaynī, 2013: 88).
living, knowing, and powerful not through 
causes (ʿilal) or in and of Himself (li nafsih) 
(al-Juwaynī, 1950: 79)
In response to the Muʿtazilah’s rejection 
of the divine attributes, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
employs two strategies to refute their argument. 
He justifies the status of “modes” in the context 
of establishing the essential attributes (al-ṣifāt 
al-nafsīyah) of God through qiyās, and second, 
he shows the necessity of applying the principle 
of causation (taʿlīl) in terms of establishing the 
conceptual attributes (al-ṣifāt al-maʿnawīyah) 
of God (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 80-94).
In the first stage, against those who argue 
that life, knowledge, and power of God are in and 
of His essence just like atom’s spatial extension 
(al-taḥayyuz) is the very foundation of the 
atom’s existence (wujūd al-jawhar), Imām al-
Ḥaramayn contends that, beyond the binary 
category of existence and non-existence, there 
is another entity called “aḥwāl (singular: ḥāl) 
or modes.” Some may refer to them “aspects 
(wujūh)” or attributes of essence (ṣifāt nafs) 
(al-Juwaynī, 1950: 82). Some of these modes 
inhere firmly in the essence or existence9 either 
due to a cause (muʿallal) or without any cause 
(ghayr muʿallal).  Among the examples of the 
first kind of modes, the caused modes, is the fact 
that the knowledgeable person is knowing. The 
“knowing” does not happen automatically but it 
occurs due to a cause, namely “knowledge”. In 
this regard, “knowing” is a mode that results from 
a cause (ʿillah or maʿnā), which is knowledge. 
As for the example of the second type of modes, 
the uncaused modes, is among other things 
9Imām al-Ḥaramayn sometimes used the term “es-
sence” and “existence” interchangeably. For example, he 
defined the uncaused mode as something additional to the 
“essence” (zā’idah ʿalā al-dhāt) in (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 80) 
Meanwhile, he also wrote that the mode is something addi-
tional to the “existence” (zāid ʿalā wujūdih) in (al-Juwaynī, 
1950: 81)  He justified this intecheangable usage of the terms 
when he explains the relationship between existence, es-
sence, and attributes. He wrote,”existence is not considered 
one of attributes because existence is the essence itself (fa 
inna al-wujūd nafs al-dhāt).” In other words, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn equated existence with essence, and vice versa, 
essence with existence. See (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 31)
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the relationship between the atom/substance/
body (jawhar) and its characteristic of spatial 
extension (al-taḥayyuz). The spatial extension 
is the mode that inheres in the atom’s essence 
but is not the essence of atom itself. Unlike the 
attribute or mode of “knowing,” which is caused 
by a factor named “knowledge” that resides in 
a subject, the “spatial extension” has no cause 
to be a mode for the atom. Following Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn’s line of argument, “the spatial 
extension” is an essential aspect of the atom, 
but at the same time, additional to the atom. It 
means that “the spatial extension” distinguishes 
the essence of the atom from other essences 
but it can be recognized as an independent 
entity that is apart from the atom’s essence.10 
This understanding of the uncaused modes, 
especially the relationship between atom and 
its attribute of spatial extension, refutes the 
arguments of Muʿtazilī theologians who claimed 
that the attributes are identical with the essence, 
like “the atom is spatially extended in and of 
itself” or “God is living, knowing, and powerful 
in and of Himself.” Imām al-Ḥaramayn writes:
“The proof indicating that there are modes is that 
when someone knows the existence of an atom 
without having knowledge of its (attribute of) spa-
tial extension, but then, the spatial extension be-
comes clear (to him), so that he obtains a new fact 
associated with an object of knowledge. In this 
regard, determining knowledge of the existence 
without having knowledge of spatial extension is 
possible. Having determined that there are two 
different forms of knowledge (first, knowledge 
of the atom’s existence, and second, knowledge 
of the spatial extension), the object of the second 
knowledge must fall under one of the two (follow-
ing) situations, either it is known (automatically) 
by means of the first knowledge or it is additional 
(zā’id) to the first knowledge. It is wrong to think 
that the object of the second knowledge is (at the 
10See the discussion of the difference between the 
hāl (mode) theory of Abū Hāshim b. al-Jubbā’ī, a Mu'tazilī 
theologian, and that of Imām al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī 
(Ajhar, 1995:  49-51; Saflo, 2000: 138-139). One of the dif-
ferences that they discus is that, for Abū Hāshim, the modes 
cannot be known independently from  the essence since they 
are predicated upon the essence, whereas for Imām al-Ha-
ramayn, the modes can be known independently apart from 
the essence.
same time) the object of the first knowledge…” 
(al-Juwaynī, 1950: 81). 
By explaining that there are two forms of 
knowledge, namely knowledge of the existence 
of the atom and knowledge of spatial extension, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn attempts to prove that the 
mode is not the same as the existence or the 
essence of the atom itself. It is inherent within the 
atom but is independent and addition to it. This 
can be understood from the fact that knowing the 
existence of an atom is not necessarily accompanied 
with knowledge of the spatial extension, and vice 
versa, knowledge of the spatial extension does not 
necessarily guarantee having knowledge of the 
existence of the atom.  With this understanding of 
the relationship between the existence of an atom 
with the mode of the spatial extension, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn applies the reasoning of qiyās and 
concludes that the relationship between the 
divine essential attributes (al-ṣifāt al-nafsīyah) 
and God resembles the relationship between the 
spatial extension and the atom. 
The qiyās reasoning in theology works with 
the principle that says, “iʿtibār al-ghā’ib bi al-
shāhid” and “qiyās al-ghā’ib ʿalā al-shāhid 
(viewing by analogy the invisible world based on 
what applies in the visible world)” (al-Juwaynī, 
1950: 82; van Ess, 1970: 34). The invisible world 
(al-ghā’ib) mainly refers to God and His attributes 
that can be apprehended through reason while the 
visible world (al-shāhid) designates the empirical 
world that can be perceived through human 
sensory devices. In order to avoid an analogical 
fallacy, such as attributing bodily organs to God 
based on the visible human physical organs, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī formulates 
four types of connections in which qiyās can be 
applied in a theological context. In other words, 
the invisible can be linked to the visible world if 
the connection between the two fulfills one of the 
following types of condition. One of them is the 
connection between the invisible and the visible 
based on illah (cause). For instance, if a person is 
knowledgeable because of knowledge (as ʿ illah) in 
the visible world, the same causal relation should 
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be applied in the invisible world as well. Another 
type of connection is based on a condition (sharṭ). 
For example, when someone cannot be knowing 
unless they are living, in which being alive 
becomes a condition (sharṭ) for knowing in the 
visible world, this kind of conditional relation 
is also extended to the invisible world. Another 
possible connection is based on the essential 
relationship (haqīqah), such as the essence of 
the knowledgeable person is the fact that they 
are the one in whom knowledge resides. The 
last type of connection between the invisible and 
the visible is based on indicatory or evidentiary 
relationship (dalīl). If a creation in the invisible 
world indicates and proves that there must be a 
creator, the same relation applies to creations that 
become an indication and proof for the existence 
of the Creator in the invisible world (al-Juwaynī, 
1950: 83-84).
Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī applies the 
theological qiyās, especially which is linked by the 
connection of essence (haqīqah), in the purpose 
of establishing the relationship between God and 
His essential attributes. The relationship between 
God and His essential attributes is analogous to 
the relationship between the atom and its mode 
of taḥayyuz (spatial extension). Since the spatial 
extension is uncaused, essential, and inherent 
mode but additional to the essence of the atom, 
the same relation applies to the relationship in the 
invisible world, which is the relationship between 
God and His essential attributes. Therefore, the 
divine essential attributes must be uncaused, 
essential, and inherent in the essence of God but 
can be recognized independently apart from His 
essence. The essential attributes of God, according 
to Imām al-Ḥaramayn, are the eternity of God, 
His Self-Subsistence, His oneness of God, and His 
difference from the creations (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 
30-60). Existence, although most of theologians 
view it as one of the attributes, is not regarded 
as an attribute because “it is the very essence 
itself” (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 31). In contrast to the 
argument of Muʿtazilī scholars who insisted that 
the attributes are in and of His essence, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn proves by means of the theological 
qiyās that these attributes are additional to His 
essence just as the spatial extension is an addition 
to the essence of atom (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 31).
Second, Imām al-Haramayn demonstrates 
the inconsistency of Muʿtazilī scholars by 
showing that they employ qiyās based on the link 
of a condition (sharṭ) between the context of both 
the possible being and the necessary being world 
but refuse to apply qiyās based on the connection 
of cause (ʿillah). In the context of the relationship 
“life” and “knowledge,” the Muʿtazilīs maintain 
that a person is considered being knowledgeable 
if they are alive. In this regard, being alive is a 
condition (sharṭ) for being knowledgeable in 
the visible/possible being world. The Muʿtazilī 
scholars apply this conditional relationship to the 
relationship between “power” and “knowledge” 
in the invisible/necessary being world. They say, 
according to Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s account, “The 
Creator being knowledgeable is conditioned on 
His being powerful” (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 87). Then, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn threw his attacking premise, 
“Since they do not make a distinction between 
the world of necessary being and the world of the 
possible being with regard to the application of a 
condition (sharṭ), such distinction should not be 
permitted to work in the context of the application 
of the cause (ʿillah)” (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 87).
With this attacking statement, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn reveals the Muʿtazilī’s inconsistency, 
namely, applying qiyās al-ghā’ib ʿalā al-shāhid 
based on the conditional relationship (sharṭ) in 
the necessary being but refuting the application 
of the qiyās based on the causal relationship 
(ʿillah) in the possible beings. 
Third, in contrast to Muʿtazilah’s argument 
that relies on qiyās as a rational proof to establish 
the relationship between knowledgeable (ʿālim) 
and powerful (qādir) or between knowledge 
(ʿilm) and power (qudrah) in the invisible world, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn relies on the traditional or 
revelatory sources instead of merely rational 
sources. He wrote:
“As for knowledge is being an addition to power, 
it is not something that can be attained with cer-
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tainty by means of reason. The (more reliable) 
method in this case is an adherence to proofs from 
revelation. In addition, the theologians have been 
debating concerning the affirmation and negation 
of the attributes, but they have a consensus with 
regard to the rejection of one (particular) attrib-
ute that can be used to establish the attribute of 
‘knowledge’ and ‘power.’ Whoever tries to estab-
lish such particular attribute and its application 
(for establishing the attribute of ‘knowledge’ and 
’power’), he violates this consensus” (al-Juwaynī, 
1950: 92).
Although some of Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s 
theological conclusions are inspired by Muʿtazilī 
rational ideas, such as Abū Hāshim’s notion of 
mode (ḥal), he still resorts to traditional proofs 
when rational proofs were not convincing enough 
or were contradictory to the traditional proofs. In 
this case, Imām al-Ḥaramayn refers to the proofs 
from the revelation and consensus to establish 
the relationship between the attribute of “power” 
and “knowledge.” Some Qur’anic passages clearly 
mention the attribute of “the most knowing” and 
“the most powerful” side by side that among other 
things, proves the affirmation of  the attribute 
of “power” and “knowledge” is based on the 
revelation.11 He also invokes the consensus that 
he believed to have occurred among theologians. 
The consensus, according to Imām al-Ḥaramayn, 
unanimously rejects the possibility of having one 
attribute, whatever it might be, for the basis of 
establishing the attribute of both “powerful” and 
“knowledgeable.”
Towards the Integration Between 
Fiqh and Kalām
As can be seen from the above discussion, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn applies jadal in his legal 
(fiqh12 and uṣūl al-fiqh13) and theological (kalām 
11See the Quran, Sūrah al-Nahl 16: 70, Sūrah al-Shūrā 
42:50, Sūrah al-Rūm 30:54, and Sūrah Fātir 35:44.
12Imām al-Ḥaramayn defines fiqh (Islamic law) as a 
scholastic science to study religious legal rules (aḥkām al-
sharīʿah), or, a scholastic science to study legal qualifica-
tions of actions performed by people who has a legal liability 
(ahl al-taklīf). See (al-Juwaynī, 1979: 27)
13Imām al-Ḥaramayn defines uṣūl  al-fiqh (principles of 
Islamic law) as  a scholastic science to study proofs that be-
come the basis of fiqh. See (al-Juwaynī, 1979: 27)
or uṣūl al-dīn14) work. In fact, this application of 
jadal in the field of law and theology becomes 
a foundation for the integration between fiqh 
(mainly through uṣūl al-fiqh) and kalām. 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s work in legal scholarship 
is no longer a mere legal treatise since it also 
includes some theological aspects and, at the 
same time, his work in the field of kalām is not 
only theological piece since it contains some 
legal elements as well. In other words, through 
the application of jadal in his works, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn attempts to integrate a theological 
perspective into legal scholarship and integrate a 
legal perspective into theological scholarship in 
order to obtain certainty in knowing the reality 
of God (through kalām) and His will (through 
fiqh). In this respect, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-
Juwaynī employs two important strategies to 
pave the way of the integration between fiqh 
and kalām: first, inserting aspects of rational 
theology into legal scholarship and, second, 
including perspectives of legal discipline into 
theological scholarship. 
a. Theological aspect in fiqh and uṣūl 
al-fiqh
The main objective of Islamic theology is 
primarily to equip Muslims with a scholastic 
tool to know God, His divine attributes, the 
characteristics of His prophets, and the laws 
of His religion  (al-Juwaynī, 1979: 28). In this 
respect, both fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh are designed to 
obtain knowledge of God’s laws, His commands 
and prohibitions, by means of which legal 
qualifications of human action are determined 
in the contexts of these two legal scholastic 
disciplines. Furthermore, knowledge of these 
divine laws and legal qualifications is believed 
to eventually lead Muslims to knowledge of God, 
which is considered as one of religious obligations 
(al-Juwaynī, 1950: 111). In his legal work, Imām 
14mām al-Haramayn equates kalām (speech, Islamic 
theology) with usūl al-dīn (principles of religion), which is 
defined as  This is a scholastic discipline designed to equip 
Muslims with a science to know God the Exalted, divine at-
tributes, the attributes of His messengers, and the laws of 
His religion (al-Juwaynī, 1979: 28)
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al-Ḥaramayn has a vision and assumption that 
an intellectual work in legal scholarship can 
provide a way to knowledge of God’s law or God’s 
will, which eventually lead to knowledge of God 
Himself. This is in fact the first theological aspect 
that Imām al-Ḥaramayn utilizes in his legal 
scholarship.
Imām al-Ḥaramayn contends that 
reasoning (naẓar) is an important tool for 
Muslims in knowing God, His attributes, 
and His laws. He even regards reasoning as 
one of religious obligations because without 
reasoning, it is impossible to have knowledge 
of God (al-Juwaynī, 1950: 11). In Islamic legal 
tradition, reasoning is primarily based on the 
proofs that are established in the revealed text 
and prophetic tradition. In other words, legal 
reasoning is text-based reasoning. Meanwhile, 
in the context of kalām, there are two important 
forms of theological reasoning, namely 
theological jadal and qiyās. Theologians 
harness these two types of reasoning to ensure 
that their intellectual path to knowledge of God 
is sound and defensible. 
The theological jadal, according to Josef van 
Ess, attempts to find what is perceived as truth 
through jadal that includes “an answer and query, 
jawāb wa-su’āl,” in which the answerer has a 
thesis to defend and the questioner challenges 
the thesis with series of question. In a written 
theological work, van Ess continues, the jadal 
question and answer appears in the following 
formula: “wa-in qāla qā’ilun…qulnā…, “if 
somebody says…we answer…,” or wa-lā yuqālu 
inna…li-annā naqūlu…, “one cannot say…
because we would answer….”(van Ess, 1970: 23). 
Interestingly, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī 
uses this theological jadal method in order to 
refute arguments of his adversaries, from either 
within Shāfiʿī legal circles or from Ḥanafī and 
other legal schools. As it can be seen from the 
above discussion, when he has a disagreement 
with al-Shāfiʿī on the issue of bayān and ijmāʿ 
and a disputation with Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī in 
the case of the extent of legal guardian authority, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn utilizes this theological 
jadal formula with certain variations and 
modifications. He uses the same theological 
jadal rhetoric to have an argument with Ḥanafī 
scholars and with other legal scholars in his 
legal works such as Tafḍīl madhhab al-Shāfiʿī 
ʿalā sā’ir al-madhāhib  (al-Juwaynī, 2013) and 
al-Durrah al-Muḍīyah fī mā waqaʿa fīhi al-
khilāf bayn al-Shāfiʿīyah wa al-Ḥanafīyah (al-
Juwaynī, 1986). In other words, the theological 
jadal formula is the second theological aspect 
that Imām al-Ḥaramayn applies in his legal 
scholarship.
In addition to the above jadal form of 
reasoning that makes a certain argument 
defensible, van Ess (1970) also identifies another 
distinct reasoning in kalām, which is theological 
qiyās. This qiyās is mainly formulated to ensure 
that the intellectual path to knowledge of God 
is sound and free from analogical and logical 
fallacies. This theological qiyās, as mentioned 
earlier, uses the principle of qiyās al-ghā’ib ʿalā 
al-shāhid, in which the invisible world (al-ghā’ib) 
is perceived and measured based on analogous 
occurrences in the visible world (al-shāhid) (van 
Ess, 1970). This qiyās is slightly different from 
the qiyās used in the Islamic legal context (fiqh 
and uṣūl al-fiqh). If the principal case (al-aṣl) in 
legal qiyās is established in the textual proofs 
of the Qur’an or Sunnah of the Prophet, the al-
aṣl in theological qiyās is found in the visible 
world (al-shāhid). While the examined case 
(al-farʿ) in fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh is represented 
by cases in which the textual proofs are either 
ambiguous, silent, or absent, the examined case 
in theological qiyās is what probably happens in 
the invisible world (al-ghā’ib). Furthermore, if 
the aṣl and the farʿ in legal qiyās is linked by 
a connecting factor that is either established 
by either textual or rational proofs, the link 
between al-shāhid and al-ghā’ib in theological 
qiyās is primarily established by a rational 
proof. Interestingly, the soundness and validity 
of qiyās in both law and theology is primarily 
determined by the soundness of a connecting 
factor that links al-aṣl and al-farʿ or between 
al-shāhid and al-ghā’ib. The connecting factor 
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is sometimes labelled with different names such 
as waṣf (characteristic), ʿillah (cause), maʿnā 
(reason or meaning), shabah  (resemblance), 
sharṭ (condition), haqīqah (essence), dalīl 
(indicatory proof), and so forth. However, in 
Islamic theology, Imām al-Ḥaramayn mentioned 
four possible valid factors that can connect 
al-shāhid and al-ghā’ib and eventually make 
theological qiyās sound and acceptable. As it is 
explained earlier, these four valid connecting 
factors are, first, causal relationship (ʿillah), 
second, the conditional relationship (sharṭ), 
third, the essential relationship (haqīqah), 
and fourth, indicatory relationship (dalīl) (al-
Juwaynī, 1950: 83-84).
In short, the spirit of theological qiyās is 
establishing rational proofs, instead of textual 
proofs, to knowledge of God, which includes 
reasoning by analogy, logic, dialectic, syllogism, 
customary practices and other non-scriptural/
textual proofs. This underlying spirit of theological 
qiyās can be seen from the fact that the principle 
case (al-aṣl) is not established by textual religious 
references but by empirical phenomena in the 
visible world (al-shāhid). The connecting factor 
between al-shāhid and al-ghā’ib is not derived 
from scriptural significations but by rational 
inferences. In this light, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
employed the theological qiyās in the spirit of 
rationalization and non-text based orientation 
to argue against his fellow Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī 
scholars. This spirit of “rational” and “non-text 
based” orientation is the third theological aspect 
that Imām al-Ḥaramayn applied in his legal 
practice and scholarship. 
As it can be seen from the above discussion, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn pushes al-Shāfiʿī on the 
definition and hierarchy of al-bayān. Instead of 
following al-Shāfiʿī’s definition of al-bayān as a 
mode of communication and its hierarchy that 
is built around the textual-scriptural mode of 
communication, Imām al-Ḥaramayn defines al-
bayān as proof and classifies al-bayān accordingly. 
By defining al-bayān as proof, he adds a rational 
dimension to what is regarded as legal proof. 
For him, the legal proof in the context of Islamic 
legal discipline is not only a textual-traditional 
proof (al-bayān al-samʿī) and its hierarchical 
quality as al-Shāfiʿī suggests but also including 
a rational proof (al-bayān al-ʿaqlī) and its rules 
of validity. In the same vein, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
refuses to accept al-Shāfiʿī’s argument regarding 
the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ (consensus). 
In contrast to al-Shāfiʿī, who uses a “textual” 
argument to justify the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ, 
he relies more on “non-textual” evidences for such 
purpose. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī asserts 
that empirical and “customary” evidence is more 
convincing and objective than the textual one to 
establish the legitimacy of ijmāʿ. It is empirical 
when the authoritativeness of ijmāʿ depends on 
an empirical observation of every member of 
Muslim community who at the end of the day will 
conclude whether or not the consensus among the 
qualified scholars actually takes place. It is also 
“customary-based” evidence when the legitimacy 
of ijmāʿ is measured by people’s attitudes 
towards those who deviate from what is believed 
to be ijmāʿ. According to Imām al-Ḥaramayn, if 
the ijmāʿ really occurs, the established customary 
practice of people will condemn the heretics and 
deviants. 
Similarly, the theological spirit of 
“rationalization” and “non-textual” orientation 
also appears in Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s interaction 
with his fellow Shāfiʿī scholars, especially Abū 
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī as discussed above. Instead of 
strictly adhering to a textual injunction in the 
case of the permissibility of forcing a mature-
virgin girl to get married as al-Shīrāzī advocates, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn considers a case-based 
reasoning perspective to adjudicate the case. He 
considers the fact that the mature-virgin girl has 
her own autonomy, volition, and capability of 
deliberation, therefore, the term “virgin” in the 
textual ḥadīth is not applied to her. As a result, 
according to him, the male legal guardian cannot 
force her to get married, unlike the opinion of Abū 
Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī. This “departure” from literal 
interpretation to embrace a factual situation and 
common sense shows that Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
al-Juwaynī can go beyond the textual-based 
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reasoning and use a case-based reasoning when 
deemed necessary. 
The fourth theological element that Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn inserts into his legal work, 
especially into uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory), is a 
theological conversation and disputation with 
notable Ashʿarī theologians and their Muʿtazilī 
opponents into conversation in his work of uṣūl 
al-fiqh, especially in al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh. 
One of the important “theological” discussions 
between Imām al-Ḥaramayn and his fellow 
Ashʿarī theologians was about the notion of 
knowledge (ʿilm). Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s attitude 
towards his Ashʿarī theological teachers was 
analogous to his attitude towards his fellow 
Shāfiʿī legal experts. He attempts to push 
doctrinal boundaries by offering a new approach 
or thought that can ascertain a higher level of 
certainty in knowledge of God. Since the purpose 
of theology is to obtain knowledge of God with a 
higher degree of certainty, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
challenges the existing conventional definition 
of knowledge offered by Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī 
and the cognitive definition of knowledge 
suggested by Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī. He criticizes 
al-Ashʿarī’s definition of knowledge as being too 
general and unclear and only explains the effect 
of knowledge on whoever has it. It does not 
explain the nature of knowledge. His criticism 
of al-Bāqillānī’s definition of knowledge, which 
is the act of knowing (maʿrifah) something as 
what really is, is directed to the fact that it is 
impossible to achieve. What an individual can 
achieve is a conviction about something resulting 
from a certain intellectual reflection. Thus, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn viewed knowledge as a kind 
of psychological certainty about a certain object. 
He defined it as a conviction (ʿaqd) related to 
a certain object as what really is. To him, this 
definition of knowledge allows an individual to 
gain knowledge of God with a higher degree of 
certainty.
Another “theological” conversation that 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn inserts in his books of uṣūl 
al-fiqh is about the notion of ijtihād and the 
status of mujtahid (the performer of ijtihād). 
In this conversation, Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
pushed the doctrinal boundaries within Ashʿarī 
theology by going beyond a binary position 
within Ashʿarī theological school. He introduced 
an innovative understanding of ghalabat al-
ẓann (preponderance of conviction) that can 
reconcile the position of al-Bāqillānī and al-
Isfarā’īnī regarding the status of two opposing 
mujtahids. Unlike al-Bāqillānī and his fellows 
who argued that two opposing mujtahids are 
correct and rewarded (i.e. taṣwīb) and al-
Isfarā’īnī and his fellows who insisted that only 
one of them is correct and rewarded while the 
other mujtahid is wrong and punishable (i.e. 
takhṭi’ah), with the innovative understanding 
of ghalabat al-ẓann, Imām al-Haramayn 
harmonizes and goes beyond the above 
two opposing opinions. He asserts that two 
opposing mujtahids are correct as far as they act 
according to their preponderance of conviction 
(ghalabat al-ẓann), but one of them must be 
wrong in the sense that he does not arrive at 
the actual ruling prescribed by God. However, 
his wrongness is not punished because what is 
demanded from a mujtahid is not to arrive at the 
actual truth or ruling prescribed by God. He is 
only expected to arrive at an approximate truth 
(ashbah) with a preponderance of conviction 
(ghalabat al-ẓann) and act according to it. In 
short, this conversation and disputation with 
his theological teachers in the work of uṣūl 
al-fiqh brings a more rational and innovative 
dimension into legal scholarship. 
b. Legal and traditional perspective in 
kalām
The second move of Imām al-Ḥaramayn 
makes to integrate legal and theological 
scholarship is the application a legal and 
traditional perspectives in his theological work, 
especially when he had a disputation with non-
Shāfiʿī jurists, especially the Ḥanafīs and non-
Ashʿarī theologians such as the Muʿtazilīs. The 
legal and traditional perspective that he employed 
considers the textual and traditional proofs from 
the Qur’an, Ḥadīth, Ijmāʿ, and legal qiyās have 
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a higher priority and hierarchical authority over 
the authority of reason and rational proofs.15 The 
legal qiyās is actually considered a form of rational 
proofs. Nevertheless, this qiyās is still admitted 
as a legal and traditional proof since its principal 
premise (al-aṣl) is inseparably connected with 
injunctions established in the textual proofs.
 Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s preference for the 
textual-oriented reasoning to the rational-
oriented reasoning appears when he had a 
disputation with Ḥanafī scholars as discussed 
earlier. When there is a contradiction between 
textual evidence in the forms of khabar al-āḥād 
and rational evidence from qiyās, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn disagreed with the position of Abū 
Ḥanīfah   and his students. While Ḥanafī legal 
scholars choose to rely on the qiyās as a rational 
proof, Imām al-Ḥaramayn preferred to stay with 
the textual proof from a solitary Prophetic report 
(khabar al-āḥād). This textual-oriented position 
shows Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s traditional attitude 
when had an argument with rationalist jurists 
represented by Ḥanafī scholars. 
Furthermore, in the debate with Muʿtazilī 
theologians, Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s legal and 
traditional perspective can be recognized from 
his use of theological qiyās to argue against the 
Muʿtazilīs who denied the divine attributes. 
Although theological qiyās is slightly different 
from the legal qiyās, both work with similar 
rules and criteria of validity. Both forms of qiyās 
have three components, the principle case (aṣl), 
the examined case (farʿ), and a certain factor 
that connects both of them (e.g. ʿillah, maʿnā, 
sharṭ, etc.). The aṣl in theology is found in the 
visible world (al-shāhid), the farʿ is found in the 
invisible world (al-ghā’ib), and the connecting 
factors between them can be based on a similarity 
of cause (ʿillah), similarity of condition (sharṭ), 
15Mu'tazilī scholars prioritize reason and rational proofs 
over the scriptural and traditional proofs  (the Qur’an, Sun-
nah, and Ijmā'). Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) formu-
lates an order of hierarchical proofs in theology: first, ratio-
nal proofs (adillat al-'aql) then followed by text-based and 
traditional authority, the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Ijmā'. See a 
partial translation of 'Abd al-Jabbār’s book Kitāb al-usūl al-
khamsah in (Martin, 1997: 91).
similarity of relationship in essence (haqīqah), 
and similarity of relationship in signification 
(dalīl). Inspired by the legal qiyās that functions 
as one of the criteria of validity for rational proofs, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn applied this theological qiyās 
to be a criterion for the valid reasoning in theology 
as well. The authority of reason as advocated by 
Muʿtazilī scholars is qualified and accepted as far 
as it complies with rules and criteria of rational 
soundness in theological qiyās. 
In this regard, Imām al-Ḥaramayn applies 
theological qiyās to establish the divine 
attributes, both the essential attributes (al-ṣifāt 
al-nafsīyah) and the conceptual ones (al-ṣifāt 
al-maʿnawīyah), against Muʿtazilah who do not 
acknowledge the divine attributes. If the atom 
in the visible world (al-shāhid) has an essential 
and uncaused attribute, especially the spatial 
extension (taḥayyuz), God in the invisible 
world (al-ghā’ib) must also have essential 
and uncaused attributes. Thus, the essential 
attributes (al-ṣifāt al-nafsīyah) of God are 
established through qiyās based on the essential 
relationship between an atom and its essential 
attribute “spatial extension” in the visible world 
(al-shāhid). Similarly, if knowledge (ʿilm) 
renders the one who has it knowledgeable (ʿālim) 
in the visible world, this causal relationship 
should also be applied in the invisible world. It 
means that God is being knowledgeable is not in 
and of Himself but caused by knowledge (ʿilm) 
that resides in Him. In other words, Imām al-
Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī harnessed theological 
qiyās to establish the legitimacy of conceptual 
attributes (al-ṣifāt al-maʿnawīyah) such as His 
being knowledgeable.
Moreover, when Muʿtazilī theologians 
argue that the relationship between “power” 
and “knowledge” can be established through a 
rational proof, by referring to the relationship 
between “knowledge” and “alive” in which the 
latter is a condition (sharṭ) for the former, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn found this argument 
unconvincing. Therefore, instead of using qiyās 
and other rational justifications to establish the 
relationship between the “power” of God and 
Jadal and the Integration of Kalām and Fiqh: A Critical Study of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī’s Application of Islamic Dialectic
Mohammad Syifa Amin Widigdo
183
His “knowledge,” he resorts to the revealed 
textual proof, which is the Qur’anic verses 
that address this topic. Some passages of the 
Qur’an frequently mention these two attributes 
together in the same verse.16 Furthermore, he 
also cites the existence of scholarly consensus 
(ijmāʿ) among theologians that rejects the 
possibility of having one distinct mode (ḥāl) 
or attribute that can be used to establish the 
legitimacy of other modes (aḥwāl) or attributes 
(ṣifāt) such as “power” and “knowledge.” In 
short, Imām al-Ḥaramayn utilized a legal 
and traditional perspective, which prioritizes 
textual and traditional proofs ranging from 
the revelation to the sound qiyās over rational 
proofs, in order to establish the divine attributes 
against Muʿtazilī theologians who deny the 
divine attributes. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, by means of applying jadal 
in legal and theological scholarship, Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn integrates effort and vision 
to understand God, His attributes, and His 
wills (i.e. commands and prohibitions) with 
a sufficient degree of certainty. This certainty 
appears in the forms of certain knowledge (ʿilm) 
and preponderance of conviction (ghalabat 
al-ẓann) that resulted from reasoning in the 
context of legal disciplines (fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh) 
and theology (kalām). Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s 
integrated vision and effort can be seen from two 
scholarly moves that he made: first, embracing 
elements of rational theology in legal scholarship, 
second, using perspectives of law and tradition in 
scholastic theology. 
These scholarly steps engender some 
interesting implications such as pushing 
doctrinal boundaries within the Shāfiʿī legal 
and Ashʿarī theological schools through 
rationalization and non-textual orientation. By 
embracing theological aspects in legal works, 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn attempted to convince his 
16See the Quran, Sūrah al-Nahl 16: 70, Sūrah al-Shūrā 
42:50, Sūrah al-Rūm 30:54, and Sūrah Fātir 35:44.
fellow Shāfiʿī jurists that they needed to adopt 
a rational theology and understanding to face 
external challenges from rationalists like Ḥanafīs 
and Muʿtazilīs. In this regard, following Imām 
al-Ḥaramayn’s argument, Ashʿarī scholastic 
theology is considered the most suitable school 
of theology that Shāfiʿī scholars must embrace 
since it is regarded as a moderate theological 
school compared to the textualist Ḥanbalīs and 
rationalist Muʿtazilīs. However, according to 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn, some Ashʿarī theological 
doctrines need a reformation. The literal and 
anthropomorphic understandings in Ashʿarī 
kalām are no longer defensible and, therefore, 
should be changed to a more rational and 
defendable theological understanding so that 
Ashʿarī theology can withstand criticism and 
threats from Muʿtazilīs. The consequence of 
pushing doctrinal boundaries within Shāfiʿī and 
Ashʿarī circles should also be situated in this 
context, which is convincing Shāfiʿī scholars 
to adopt Ashʿarī theology and defending both 
Shāfiʿī legal teachings and Ashʿarī theology from 
external challenges and criticism. 
Another implication from Imām al-
Ḥaramayn’s move of integrating theology into law 
as well as law into theology is making rationalist 
groups, such as Ḥanafīs and Muʿtazilīs, more 
respectful and willing to submit themselves 
to legal and traditional sources of authority. 
We call this implication as “traditionalization” 
of rational teachings in Islamic scholarship, 
especially theology. In this way, Muʿtazilī 
(including Ḥanafī) rational methods and ideas 
can be either proven false and contradictory to 
textual sources or can be adopted with some 
modification (e.g. the idea of ḥāl of Abū Hāshim). 
However, the more important consequence 
from this “traditionalization” is that Imām al-
Ḥaramayn could have shown to his fellow Shāfiʿī 
jurists and Ashʿarī theologians that he was still 
loyal and staying within a broader boundary of 
Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī tradition. 
Imām al-Ḥaramayn’s integrated vision and 
effort to obtain certainty through applying jadal 
in fiqh, uṣūl al-fiqh, and kalām pave the way for 
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the integration between fiqh (mainly through 
uṣūl al-fiqh) and kalām. In addition to the fact 
that Imām al-Ḥaramayn believes that he achieves 
the certainty that he was looking for in legal and 
theological scholarship, one of the most important 
results from his intellectual works is a general 
acceptance of kalām scholarship, especially 
Ashʿarī kalām, within the circles of legal scholars, 
especially within Shāfiʿī legal school. This general 
acceptance, in turn, challenges the existing 
definition of Sunnī orthodoxy in the first half of 
the eleventh century. Sunnī orthodoxy which had 
been associated with merely legal schools needed 
a reformulation since Ashʿarī kalām had already 
been integrated and adopted to be part of Sunnī 
orthodoxy by Shāfiʿī scholars.
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